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 The Politics of the Strategic Defence and Security Review: Centralisation 
and Cuts  
ROBERT DOVER AND MARK PHYTHIAN 
 
Introduction 
The October 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), Securing Britain in an 
Age of Uncertainty—the first substantial defence review in over a decade and the first time 
that strategy regarding defence, security and intelligence had been formally integrated into a 
single review—has inevitably attracted a substantial amount of commentary.1 Much of it has 
focused on individual case studies—be it on a particular equipment programme, the plight of 
service personnel and their families, or a particular geographical area to be affected by the 
cuts. We do not propose to go over what is rapidly becoming old ground in this regard. 
Instead, we examine the politics of the SDSR—that is, the party politics and the political 
dynamics of the review process, focused on the government’s mission to reduce the ‘historic 
deficit’, and the centralisation of defence policy. We also examine the political philosophy 
that is currently being implemented across Whitehall in which defence is emerging as a path-
finding issue area for a new kind of post-industrial bureaucratic environment typified by a 
‘thin-client’ and ‘smart customer’ function that interacts with industry. 
 
Party politics 
The SDSR was the first major defence review since New Labour’s 1998 Strategic Defence 
Review (SDR), which had been well received by practitioners and commentators alike. The 
SDR had taken over a year to produce and had taken on board a wealth of external and expert 
views. Indeed, it was characterised at the time as being the most open defence review ever 
conducted in the United Kingdom.2 It was also to a significant degree foreign-policy-led, 
premised on the idea that there needed to be a strategic refocusing of defence to match up to 
the post-Cold War realities of a changed geostrategic picture; the Cold War reality had been 
dangerous but stable, this new reality was dangerous and unstable. In one sense, then, little 
has changed in the overall framing of defence questions between the SDR and the SDSR: the 
international system is still dangerous and it is still unstable. After the certainties of the Cold 
War, the strategic environment in 2010, as in 1998, was characterised by uncertainty.  
A key advance made by the 1998 SDR was in the beginning of ‘jointery’: the 
connection of joint working structures both within the British armed forces and then between 
them and their European and NATO colleagues (much of this thinking tied in with the efforts 
to reinvigorate the European defence projects, which culminated in the 1998 St Malo Accords 
and the 2000 Nice Treaty). As befitted a government that held very positive attitudes towards 
the European Union (EU), rather too much emphasis was placed on the EU as a source of 
force multiplication for Britain—collaborative procurement projects with the EU would 
produce better equipment at a better price, and joint working would eventually drum out the 
wasteful duplication of effort across the Union. But the SDR ultimately failed, partly as a 
result of intra-governmental tension between the respective visions of the Prime Minister and 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and the centrality of defence to each. Tony Blair saw a strong 
defence policy as crucial to the establishment and success of the ‘New Labour’ brand. For 
example, documents retrieved from Labour party pollster Philip Gould’s dustbin in 2000 
included a memo in which Blair had worried about ‘asylum and crime, where we are 
perceived as soft; and asserting the nation's interests where, because of the unpopularity of 
Europe, a constant barrage of small stories beginning to add up on defence and even issues 
like Zimbabwe, we are seen as insufficiently assertive. … We are in fact, taking very tough 
measures on asylum and crime, Kosovo should have laid to rest any doubts about our strength 
in defence.’ Still, Blair worried about seeming ‘out of touch’ and warned Gould that ‘we need 
to make the CSR [comprehensive spending review] work for defence. Big cuts and you can 
forget any hope of winning back ground on “standing up for Britain”.’3 In contrast, Brown 
was always more of a sceptic on defence and, especially as defence cost inflation spiralled 
during the 2000s, he sought to steadily reduce the defence budget. These twin pressures were 
exacerbated by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which severely strained the defence budget 
and hastened the demise of equipment in theatre, with little plan regarding how to replenish 
or repair stocks.  
The origins of many of the problems faced by the SDSR are to be found in the SDR. 
Expensive equipment procurement decisions (like the aircraft carriers) were flagged up in the 
SDR, but only resolved in the dying days of the Brown government. Similarly, decisions 
regarding armoured troop moving vehicles (the ‘snatch Land Rover’/IED debate) were 
botched or avoided during most of the New Labour 2000s, resulting in both anguish to 
service families and large cost over-runs in trying to sort these problems out in a hurried 
manner. In the absence of a thorough overhaul of defence management the problem of the 
Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) inflexibility, and unresponsiveness in the face of changing 
operational and commercial demands was never resolved.  
The challenge for the incoming Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government 
in May 2010 was to address the multiple problems bequeathed by New Labour: under-
investment in defence, unfunded defence spending promises, institutional problems in the 
MoD, the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and, of course, the record-breaking deficit being 
carried forward by the Treasury. Whilst a long period of reflection on defence, akin to that 
which preceded the SDR, was probably necessary, and almost certainly desirable, the 
coalition government’s insistence on prioritising rapid deficit reduction in effect outweighed 
all other considerations. The MoD was quickly identified as a department ripe for budgetary 
cuts, and from evidence we collected from officials in the MoD, they were under no illusion 
that the main driver of the review was financial, and their job was to provide the best review 
in this context. 
At the same time, whilst the SDSR was accused of being conducted overly hastily, it 
is possible to trace its recommendations and intellectual antecedents back through the 
previous three years’ worth of Conservative party announcements and policy developments. 
It is interesting to note how much of the intellectual framing work of the SDSR had been 
done prior to the review process commencing. In opposition, the Conservative party had 
promised a defence review, and had produced their own national security Green Paper in 
January 20104 with the intention that this would provide much of the foundational thinking 
for the SDSR. Thus the timing of the review, which was to come out just before the 
Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), was an attempt to demonstrate how the SDSR was 
the result of a considerable period of policy gestation and so emphasise its strategic 
dimension. It is interesting to note, however, that most of the contributing authors to the 
January 2010 Conservative Green Paper were not party to the government’s review. 
Furthermore, Secretary of State for Defence Dr Liam Fox’s leaked September 2010 letter to 
Prime Minister David Cameron, in which he complained that a mishandled SDSR would 
diminish the party and government’s credibility on the issue of defence, can be partly read as 
a defence of the intellectual work done whilst in opposition.5 
One notable aspect of the three main parties’ approach to defence at the beginning of 
the 2010 general election year was the remarkable level of cohesion between them on key 
points. Whilst the Lib-Dems were, once again, outliers with their pledge to not renew 
Britain’s nuclear deterrent, all three main parties were keen to emphasise the need for a (more 
or less) strategic defence review, a renewed commitment to servicemen and women who had 
served the country well in Afghanistan and Iraq (a response to the increasing salience of the 
charge that the military covenant had been breached by the Labour government) and smarter 
forms of procurement. The Labour government clearly had a record to defend (and their 
pronouncements were markedly defensive in tone), whilst the Lib-Dems and Conservatives 
had interesting points of convergence concerning European involvement in British defence, 
since implemented via the November 2010 Anglo-French Defence Accords. All agreed on 
the need to reform defence expenditure (with Labour keen to emphasise additional funding 
during their terms in office, and the Tories and Lib-Dems keen to argue that defence spending 
was out of control and haphazardly implemented). So, while there were some differences of 
substance between the three main parties, there were no serious points of departure. This fact 
helps explain why the initial fears amongst parliamentarians (and the SDSR team) that the 
coalition government might come under internal strain because of the review were quickly 
dispelled, particularly once the Lib-Dems stopped pushing on their nuclear preferences.  
What we can observe in the aftermath of the review are differences on the minutiae of 
the specific proposals. One example of this can be found in the Labour party’s newfound 
enthusiasm for codifying the military covenant, which seemed to emerge at the moment when 
the coalition government had appeared to back out of a pledge by David Cameron to make 
the covenant legally enforceable. The government were keen not to be caught on the hooks of 
having established a superior set of standards for one group of citizens, to be able to be held 
legally accountable for this duty of care and to have established an ill-defined benchmark for 
the media and their political opponents to constantly reference. Between the three major 
parties there were, however, no real disagreements about the need to produce defence 
spending cuts, or about the need to reform the defence sector. 
 
The internal dynamics of the Review: centralisation to the core 
Formally, the SDSR was led by the MoD, but in practice it was led by two senior Cabinet 
Office civil servants: Hugh Powell and Peter Ricketts, the latter of whom is the British 
government’s National Security Adviser and a former Chair (2000–2001) of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee, thus bringing the security dimension, already flagged up by the 
Conservative party’s opposition-era groundwork, foursquare into the review. The MoD’s 
senior official in the review was said, in private interviews regarding the SDSR process, to 
have been marginalised during the Review, despite his prominence in delivering the Labour 
government’s defence vision document, Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the 
Strategic Defence Review, in February 2010. Even within the MoD’s SDSR unit there were 
secondees from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and an observer from the American 
Department of Defense, who had been included to avoid a repetition of the situation 
experienced in 1998 where State and Defense Department officials were informed of the St 
Malo negotiations but failed to pass the message up the political levels, causing discomfort 
on both sides of the Atlantic.  
The SDSR was conducted almost exclusively by civil servants, with a very strong 
lead being given by Cabinet Office Minister Oliver Letwin, with only a nod to a very narrow 
cleavage of London-based policy advisors sufficient enough to provide evidence that 
consultations had taken place. It is this narrow consultation that has presumably caused the 
flurry of commentary suggesting alternative routes and different proposals during the Review 
window and subsequently.6 It is certainly emerging as a tactical error. If the Review had been 
the product of a broader consultative process, the MoD might not have had to fight such a 
rear guard action subsequently. In the event, the MoD was placed in the unfortunate position 
of having to maintain the fiction of being the lead department, contain internal dissent, and 
respond to political and media criticism of the review’s outcomes, whilst at the same time 
managing its own disappointment. As a former party challenger to David Cameron, Defence 
Secretary Fox was also placed in the unenviable position of trying to defend a department he 
was instinctively close to as well as formally led whilst not openly undermining the new 
Prime Minister. Some of this tension bubbled to the surface in the private letter Fox had 
written to Cameron being leaked to the Daily Telegraph. Even worse, traditional-thinking 
institutions within the MoD had either been scrapped (for example, the Advanced Research 
Assessment Group), or had been neutered and ordered to brief against its own research (for 
example, the Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre, who had provided some of the 
foundational thinking in the February 2010 Adaptability and Partnership document). So, the 
MoD, as an institution, failed to advise and inform itself properly—a symptom of the 
centralisation of powers to the Cabinet Office.  
The pressure-cooker effect of restricting the thinking work of the Review to such a 
small number of officials provoked some asymmetric parliamentary action in an attempt to 
apply some pressure on the MoD and the government.7 Bernard Jenkin’s move from the 
Defence Select Committee (which described the speed of the SDSR as ‘startling’8) to the 
Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) saw the latter begin to engage in defence- 
and security-related governance questions. The PASC’s major piece of work over the 
summer 2010 period was its investigation into Who Does Strategy?—interpreted by some 
close to the SDSR process as a criticism of the absence of strategy in the Review. The PASC 
published its Who Does Strategy? report three days before the SDSR. Via this timing its point 
was driven home: the SDSR was a cost-cutting exercise, they were calling for a serious look 
at Britain’s strategic position, a very different proposition and one ahead of its time in the 
context of the military action against Libya in early 2011.9 Indeed, the entire PASC Strategy 
report can be read as a sustained critique of the SDSR process and the outgoing Labour 
government’s handling of defence and security policy. Its call for a reorientation of strategic 
thinking, with practical measures on how to engender such thinking, makes for compelling 
reading.  
In the wake of this, the PASC has also established a review into how the civil service 
is managed, and how it will develop in the post-CSR era. We have been told that this is partly 
inspired by the case of defence management, where those involved believe that the 
transformation from a technocrat-led MoD to one subject to short-termism and dislocation to 
the Cabinet Office and Downing Street risks introducing serious failings into defence public 
policy making. So, it appears that the decision to keep very close control over the SDSR, 
contrary to the 1998 experience with the SDR, has generated significant unintended 
consequences: the squabbling between the three services was unedifying and unfortunate, but 
a good fight has been put up by parliamentarians (and their unofficial advisers) who are 
passionate in their alternative vision to the cost-cutting and centralised approach to defence 
policy.  
The question of deficit reduction and financing dominated the work on the SDSR. 
One of the key problems identified by the SDSR team during the final stages of the Review 
was the fluid nature of the financial figures being delivered to them. Precise costings from 
initiatives such as scrapping the Harrier jump-jets are difficult to obtain quickly due to the 
large number of variables that come with such a programme (such as maintenance, storage, 
the cost of scrappage itself, etc.). Consequently, as the review process moved towards its 
October 2010 deadline, the initial cost figures (which had been expressed to the team in terms 
of ranges of figures) became firmer but in most cases did not provide the anticipated volume 
of savings. Even post-Review the savings figures on equipment programmes have remained 
imprecise. The figure published by the government in February 2011, of £12 billion savings 
on equipment lines remained largely unevidenced and immune from the sort of scrutiny to 
which many informed experts wished to subject it.10  
The problems in accurately costing the options put forward by the SDSR have 
generated the political momentum to revisit the defence budget in 2011, something which is 
possible through the implementation phase of the SDSR, which is reviewing the Defence 
Estates, the work on the New Employment Model, and the possibility of revisiting equipment 
programmes. The problems in accurately costing proposals cannot simply be attributed as a 
failure on the part of the Review team. It is a phenomenon that is widespread across the 
MoD, and one we found to be particularly true with regard to the Defence Estates, where the 
problem of matching up Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors red-book valuations to reality 
appears to be an impossible art in an area that looks set for additional deep cuts in 2011.  
Large swings in possible capital receipts from asset disposals or foreclosing projects 
does throw the problem of budgetary planning in the MoD into sharp relief, and with the 
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) projecting the shortfall at the end of SDSR at £1–2 
billion (and the lower end of these figures were confirmed to us in interview evidence) the 
need to find additional savings in 2011 is clear, however much the government may be keen 
to avoid formally reopening the Review. More worrying is the mood music around the 
implementation phase of the SDSR. In interviews, officials were keen to point towards the 
desperate measures being taken in the name of deficit reduction. Some suggested a fire-sale 
of government holdings, whilst others said that capital spend projects with a horizon of ten 
years or more were now untenable, that existing private finance initiatives (PFIs) deemed to 
represent poor value for money were now apt to be forcibly renegotiated. In short, radical 
solutions are plainly still ‘on the table’, despite the budget surplus for January 2011, which 
points towards a less gloomy economic environment.  
Part of this radical thinking we explore in the final section of this article: the work of 
Lord Levene’s Defence Reform Unit (DRU) and the design of the Defence Infrastructure 
Organisation are indicative of a whole new bureaucratic paradigm for the British civil 
service. The Defence Estate (since April 2011, the Defence Infrastructure Organisation), 
given its size at an estimated £31 billion comprising 2 per cent of all land in the United 
Kingdom, is the obvious place to seek further cuts. The review of the defence estates 
conducted by the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London was advised by a 
Downing Street strategist to ‘try and find a billion pounds worth of cuts’ if it were to gain 
traction within Number Ten policy circles. The arbitrary figure of £1 billion is emblematic of 
how the SDSR and similar reviews in other departments have proceeded: the coalition 
government’s overarching priority has been to reduce the government deficit; secondary 
policy objectives have fitted around the deficit reduction programme.  
 
Political philosophy: the Defence Reform Unit—delivering transformative change  
The DRU was established in August 2010, alongside the SDSR but ostensibly to follow on 
from the Review, to examine the shape, structure, management and governance of the MoD. 
The work of the DRU is described by the MoD as one of the Secretary of State’s three key 
priorities (the other two being Afghanistan and the SDSR), and the Steering Group of the unit 
was chaired by Lord Peter Levene, the former Chief of Defence Procurement. Levene’s 
formidable reputation in defence circles led to MoD insiders seeing it as prefacing a large 
round of budgetary cuts and disposals, particularly in the estates. The precise detail of this 
concern was wrong, but the sentiment is right: Levene’s unit has worked as a large engine for 
change in the MoD and the reforms that it will recommend in the summer of 2011 will 
fundamentally change the way the Ministry does its work, with the clear potential to ripple 
out across the rest of Whitehall as well. Levene’s unit seeks to create what will amount to a 
paradigm shift in the way the civil service operates—‘delivering the big change now’, as one 
official put it. The DRU has been staffed by MoD civil servants, who took a responsive 
stance to the unit members, taking instructions and responding to their lead rather than 
bringing MoD institutional memory to the unit. In the event, the DRU has focused on 
transforming the governance of the MoD, working on the assumption that if it finds a new 
and workable solution then effective managers will deliver the sort of changes that the new 
politics of the coalition—with attendant economic savings—demands.   
The DRU has taken its transformative role seriously and has put in place a defence 
infrastructure that officials believe is better able to interact with (as a so-called ‘thin-client’), 
and respond to its commercial partners up to and including these institutions (mainly Defence 
Procurement at Abbeywood, Bristol, and the new Defence Infrastructure Organisation, DIO) 
being privatised. The two options being considered by the DRU are the imposition of a 
privately owned and run interface organisation (which would be unpaid and would derive its 
money from savings) from existing large-scale providers, or the retention of a ‘thin-client’ 
defence client playing an ‘intelligent customer’ role with private industry. Rather than 
utilising the talents within the MoD, this intelligent customer would seek outside talent and 
pay them exceptionally well. This sort of private sector thinking has come directly from the 
DRU steering group.  
The thin-client model and the direct privatisation of these organisations would be a 
significant development in British defence politics, which has seen a large amount of 
commercial activity coming into the defence realm from the privatisation of core defence 
research capabilities (DERA to QINETIQ), private facilities management of MoD offices and 
establishments, and the private provision of defence education and training. The question of 
how large the market would be for the contract to run an interface organisation also gets to 
the heart of how viable such a proposal is. If the DIO was replaced or run by a private 
provider, one suspects that there would not be a great advantage—after all, commercial 
acumen is only likely to get the organisation so far, and competition is far more important to 
the logic of privatisation than just placing managers with commercial experience in certain 
positions, even if the intention is to leave an ‘intelligent customer function’ within the MoD. 
It is said that the DRU’s plan for making such a venture cost-saving is not just through 
greater efficiency (the sort they naturally expect commercially aware individuals to manage), 
but also because the organisation will receive no public money for their management 
activities: the profit for the company will come in making savings that they will  be able to 
keep. It is not clear whether there is the necessary political support for such a venture, and so 
it is likely that any future privatisation of this function might have to follow the regional 
contracts model currently run in the MoD, so that there were a greater number of companies 
bidding for the work, which could then deliver the intended efficiency savings.  
The general trend towards industry collaborations permeates all branches of the 
defence community, from the manager of sensitive sites suggesting private solutions to 
facilities management at these sites, to the MoD’s consultation website posing questions 
about what further roles industry might take in the delivery of defence functions.11 But the 
cross-Whitehall proposals in this regard will be even more radical. The work of the so-called 
‘Shareholder Executive’ (SHAREX),  which is reviewing the government’s land-holdings, is, 
we are told, taking a radical approach to the future of government land, including to 
Whitehall itself. Whilst SHAREX is formally separate from the defence estates, this kind of 
radicalism—or as one official put it ‘the desperate measures for desperate times’—clearly has 
the potential to be applied to other areas of government activity. This is the rewiring of 
British governance, a further step in the hollowing out of the state: a reduction to a contract 
negotiating and grant-giving function, whilst the implementation of government functions is 
entirely held by private or charitable organisations.12   
The transformation the DRU has sought in the MoD also extends to its division into 
three teams, covering Political, Strategic and Financial issues; the Armed Forces; and 
Acquisition and Estates. Officials we interviewed for this article argued that this division may 
work its way through into the MoD proper, as it had gained ‘a great deal of traction’ within 
Main Building. Such a division would also greatly assist moves to reduce the size of the MoD 
and to consolidate downwards onto a smaller staffing footprint. Such a reorganisation of the 
MoD would genuinely constitute a transformation of its activities. The move towards leaner 
government bureaucracies that seek to mediate the interface between the government and 
commercial partners entrenches the dominant position of large private conglomerates that 
started off life being involved in construction or facilities management contracts, but that 
would now start to dominate the defence community and public administration in general. 
Adopting the model that is to be piloted in defence would deliver the year-on-year savings 
the government says are necessary, but it would also reduce the size of the civil service—
something that government politicians (of both colours) are wedded to for ideological 
reasons.  
 
Conclusion 
The SDSR represents an interesting moment politically. There was a surprising amount of 
cross-party agreement—certainly on the fundamentals, if not the detail of the SDSR—
although the government made the error of appearing to U-turn on the issue of bringing the 
military covenant into law in April 2011, which allowed the covenant to become the issue on 
which both major parties have fought for the high ground on defence. The Labour party 
opposition now believes it has a weighty political stick with which to beat the government in 
the area of defence policy, which they hope will assist in resurrecting their ‘strong on 
defence’ credentials, which Tony Blair worked hard to develop but which were severely 
damaged by the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. The fact that the SDSR was closed and 
hurried, especially in contrast to the 1998 SDR, sparked widespread dissent within the 
services (with inter-service rivalry breaking out into open hostility during the Review) and in 
Parliament via the Defence and Public Administration committees, which both made strong 
attempts to shape the Review’s conclusions. This dissent could have largely been avoided had 
there been a greater sense of consultation—a relative absence all the more curious in the light 
of the government’s pledges on transparency and openness in government.  
The SDSR was shaped around the overriding political priority of reducing the 
government’s deficit, rather than around a sense of the strategic need which mortgaged the 
United Kingdom’s defence future to the war in Afghanistan and cyber warfare. The 
democracy contagion spreading through the Middle East and the military action over Libya in 
early 2011 has the potential to make the SDSR’s fundamental assumptions obsolete in under 
a year, and the problems of making accurate financial statements and projections on defence 
also have the potential to derail the Review’s findings. The need to find an additional £1 
billion savings in 2011 neatly links the MoD’s defence estates to the wider review of 
government property holdings in SHAREX—a body which seems bent on radical cuts. Very 
large cuts in the defence estates might leave the United Kingdom vulnerable to single points 
of failure, and because of the problems in generating new capital spending lines, also 
represent a point of no return.  
More widely, and we believe more significantly, the SDSR (in parallel with other 
government reviews) is heralding a new form of bureaucratic governance in the United 
Kingdom. The SDSR process provides an excellent example of the way that government 
functions are being centralised, but as a prelude to privatisation and the shrinking of the state 
rather than as an end in itself; the control of the Review by the Cabinet Office and Treasury 
undermines the MoD’s claim to expertise and ownership of defence issues, something which 
had changed between February and October 2010, and can only be put down to the change of 
administration. The work of the DRU represents a paradigm shift in the way that bureaucratic 
functions will take place in the future. The DIO has been established with its eventual 
privatisation in mind, and the plans for MoD governance are all geared at providing a thin-
client and intelligent customer function (so contract negotiation and management, but no 
actual implementation done in house), with employees being brought in with commercial 
experience, rather than re-skilling existing civil servants. This is not so much the shrinking of 
the state, as the wholesale replacement of the state with private contractors. What happens in 
defence governance has the clear potential to be replicated across the whole of government, 
representing a critical loss of the public-service-oriented technical expertise and nimbleness 
that is vital in fighting wars.  
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